CHAPTER IV
PRAGMATICS
After I read Bob Hale
and Crispin Wright’s book about a Companion to The Philosophy of Language, there
were a lot of things that I concluded:
Pragmatics
has two versions of non-equivalent characterizations:
a. The
first, pragmatics concern about the linguistic phenomena left untreated by
phonology, syntax and semantics.
b. And the second version, pragmatics is the
study of properties of words depend on their having been spoken, or reacted to,
in a certain way, or in certain conditions, or in the way, or conditions, they
were.
Same
with pragmatics, semantics also have two different versions of non-equivalent
characterizations.
a. First,
semantics is concerned with certain relations between words and the world
centrally with those on which the truth or falsity of words depends thus
davidlewis’s slogan “semantics with no treatment of truth conditions is not
semantics.
b. Second,
semantics is defined by this idea a theory of meaning for a language should be
able to tell us the meanings of the words and sentences which comprise the
language.
If
we talk about pragmatics itself, we also have to know about semantics because
both of them cannot be separated.
From
the combination of these different ideas such things as English sentences have
stat able conditions for truth, and meaning can be given in or by stating
these, that might be wrong, why, perhaps as J.L. Austin suggested, questions of
truth arise out of different level entirely that of expression of a language.
So, if the second version of pragmatics and the first version of semantics
questions are pragmatic ones, whereas semantics ( second version ), however it
is to be done, would have little or nothing to do with the truth conditions. So
this is pragmatic view.
So
for the first are semantics properties:
a.
Semantics properties
There are two classes of such properties
that they have to consider:
·
The first sort of property is one of
relating in given way to truth or (falsity). Properties of being true (false).
If, given, of, or only if, thus, and so, or thus, or the way things are, are
all within this class. (they are all properties words might have on one
understanding and lack on another). For future convenience, they exclude being
true or false simpliciterfrom this class. Though they include being true
(false) given that way things are, they call these properties truth-involving
and any set of them a truth conditions.
·
The second sort is properties identified
without mention of truth, and on which truth-involving properties depend. Such properties
include such things are describing x as y, calling x y, saying x to be y,
speaking of y. the words is for example speak of being red and on a speaking,
may have called something red. These properties identify what words say. They
call them content –fixing and any set of them content.
b.
The pragmatic view
Is
what sentence means compatible with semantic variety- specifically variety in
truth conditions. Across its speaking? This sentence:
(1) The
leaves are green
The
words ‘are green’ meaning what they do are means for calling this green,
similarly, meaning what they do. “The leaves”. When spoken as in (1), purport
to speak some leaves. What is present tense means makes (1). On speaking
purport roughly to speak of things at the time of that speaking. Consider
speaking of (1) in which the words did all things, and it all other respect if
any meant what they mean. Does that much semantic on all such speaking? Or is
that much compatible with semantic variety, and specifically with those words
having on different speaking, any of many truth-conditions.
If
any object is painted green, should its colour count as what is would be
without the paint, or rather as what it has been coloured by painting it? Nor
is it plausible that some further development in natural science might resolve this
issue. So the first option must be rejected. Nor as we shall see are colours
are unfair example. There are similar problem for any simple predicate, ones
left unsolved by what the words in question mean. They begin on second option.
Its simplest version is that (1) is ambiguous, or that the words are green.
The
above need not to be the only ambiguity in the English is green. But if words
are ambiguous in English, there must be a way of saving just what these ambiguities
are: so a fact as to how many ways ambiguous they are.
So
for this conclusion this one. Is it might be said that the phenomena
show’green’ to be vargue term.
In
one sense, perhaps words are vague if there is not enough in a correct
understanding of them for deciding whether. Given the way the things they speak
of are, they ought to count true or false. The English sentence (1) is
certainly in that conditions. But one speaking it may clearly state what is
true, while another clearly states what is false. That only can be so if the
semantics of (1) on some speaking of it is substantially richer than that fixed
for it by the meanings of its constituents, and richer in different ways such
speakings. So what (1) says on a speaking of given leaves.etc.it is not
determined merely by what it,orits parts, mean.
c.
Domestications
In
dictionary, domestic is home or house, but what I read in this book tell me
that to find what domestication from many examples is: so for the first let’s
see.
There
are two plans of such domestication. First, plans turns on the idea of
ellipsis, some words are to be understood as short for others. A particular “he’ll
come, for example. Maybe rightly construed as shortened ‘he’ll come to the
party, assuming ellipsis were pervasive, how might it help? If the example maybe
used to say of many things, it must on different speakings, be elliptical for
different things. Second, suggestion revolves around this idea, what words mean
does determine what they say. But it does not do so simpliciter,rather, it does
so as a function of some set of factors, or parameter in speaking of the words
the parameters allow for different things to be said in different such
speakings. Such was always in the plan for linking sentences with truth
conditions. The plan illustrated by freege’s treatment, such speaking. One
things this shows is that the words say in example; the leaves to be green at
that time, it means to say it must relevan when we will say it.
There
is a factor the time they were spoken and a function fixed by what they mean.
From values the time the spoke so there are three kinds of how to know it:
·
For the present tense the time referred
to is always the time of speaking
·
Where present tense words are spoken
·
What the example means determined as a
function from variables in its speaking to thoughts expressed on those
speakings.
d.
Implicature
In
this part, we will know some understanding about implicature by understand the
example.
First
the starting is the observation that saying is only of numerous ways for words,
or speakers of hem to represent things. So there is also implying, suggesting,
insinuating, presupposing, and so on. The philosopher “grice” though, concerned
himself with a particular class such representations, which he called
implicature, using the verb ”implicature” for the sort of representing in
question. Implicature comes in two sort: conventional and conversational.
1. Conventional
Conventional implicature are features of
the meaning of terms involved. They are illustrated for example by “ pia
dissuaded tod from leaving”. And “ sam struggled to reach the lectern”. From
the first tod as at least as facing some obstacle to reaching the lectern.
Grice suggest that it s difficult tp produce words with conventional
implicature without implicating that. Such implicature are not, or hardly grice
call’ cancellable’ that grice take to be a main identifying feature of them.
2. Conversational
Grice notes, arise only on certain
speakings of words so are cancellable, these grice calls conversational
implicature. In normal conversation, we represent ourselves as observing
certain maxims. And maybe supposed to do so, grice call these conversational
maxim. Examples are: be-cooperative, be brief, be informative, and be relevant.
Sometimes speaker seems to violate some of these maxims. But it may be that he
would not have If such and such and it may be unreasonable to take the speaker
said that P ( In saying W) saying P or (saying it in W) would violate the
maxims unless Q. the speaker was not violating the maxims.
The notion of conversational implicaturepoints
to be a particular sort of understanding some words, on some speakings, may
bear. Nothing in the pragmatic view suggest that there should not be such
understanding, note , though, that, as grice insist, for Q to be
conversationally implicated. In words ‘W’. Q must follow from what W said or
the fact that w said it , or both.
e.
Metaphysics
To
understand pragmatic form metaphysic view, we also can take definition from
understanding the example. For example: the leaves are green.
The
English is ‘green’ speak of a certain way for things to be green. One might say
that it speaks of a certain property: being green. If we do say that, we must
say this about that property. What sometimes counts as a things having it
sometimes does not, so that there are, maybe, things which, on some occasions
or judging counts as having the property, and on others do not. Two related
questions to speak with extension.
·
Might there be predicates which did not
vary their contributions. To what was said with them is the way that is ‘green’
does?
·
Can we preserve the idea that genuine
properties have extentions by supposing that predicate like is ‘green’ simply?
The
right understanding of it would foresee every eventuality in or o which the
description might be applied. There is reason to think what is said applying a
given description depends on how its applied and how in given circumstance, it
ought to be.
f.
Perspective
In
understanding from perspective view, we will take definition by comparing two
examples are:
1) The
leaves are green
2) Today
is sunny day
For
the first we will see the leaves are green. Here one thought. The words are ‘
green’ are means which English provides for calling things green (describing
them as green.) if, in speaking English you want to call an item green, those
words will do. Speak them literally, seriously, and so forth and you will count
as having done just that. Precisely on whether the way that item is then count
as is being green. These two remarks jointly identify which truth-involving
properties any such words must have they are true of and only of those way for
things to be which counted, as their speaking as the item the spoke of being
green. Similarly for other English predicates.
Second,
today is sunny day. Spoken on day D would typically speak of day D. it would
also identify the day it speaks of in a particular way. It speaks of that day
of its speaking and represent it as identified by that fact. Since some
speaking of the example above has both the semantic properties just mentioned.
The two jointly from a semantic which is at least sometimes coherent. Let D*
the day after D, words produced in D could not have the semantic just
mentioned. They could not speak of D and say it to be sunny, while on their
proper understanding. Identifying the day they speak of as the day of their
speaking.
So
we have to said there is something true and something false of their condition
at given time, and also those things to be said state the true one and deny the
false one. The pragmatic view requires that is it true to say it something it
could be not true to say so the view is wrong. Each of the thought provided for
above is a perspectival thought.
g.
Thought
Based
on what freege‘s write about thought. He stated that “without
offering this a definition, I meant by the thought something for which the
question of truth can arise at all.
For
freege thought is not words. For him words are true only in a derivate sense.
Just in case they express a thought which is for words are always open to and
in need of , interpretation. If words admit interpretation then conceivably
they may bear different understanding on different occasions for understanding
them. Thought, for which questions of truth are, strictly speaking, to arise,
are meant to be free in principle of both of the above features. Freege is to
be absolutely immune to interpretation, and freege is to be true or false absolutely
independent of the ways. On freege’s view only such semantic object could be
material for logic.
A
thought cannot just have truth-involving properties, it must have content. What
content should that be? A thought is meant to be something that can be
expressed in various words, speakings, on various occasions.
h.
Concluding remarks
The
pragmatic view gives a substantially different form to virtually every
philosophic problem. Not just in philosophy of language, but wherever. We may
take a fresh look at what we say to people in ascribing propositional attitude
to them and at understanding itself.
